Compatibilism is a cope.

Meet the nonsensical free will justification, born of fear, and inspiring the “Noble Lie.” Studies show that 70-90% of philosophers are Compatibilists, but a scant few delve into why.

I’ve always been drawn to debates about free will because, over time, I’ve come to see it as the core structure propping up systems that reward and punish, like religion and capitalism.

While my main focus is on economic and social policy, AI and UBI (universal basic income) the free will debate has become central to my thinking. It’s the support beam for ideologies that thrive on basic desert moral responsibility—rewarding success and punishing failure as if they were purely individual achievements or shortcomings.

Don’t get me wrong; I like both religion and capitalism in moderation (I’m a card carrying progressive Nordic-style social democrat—think of it as “capitalism lite” with personal freedom, competition, but also a robust safety net) but we have to guard against the extremes of fundamentalist religion and laissez-faire, social Darwinist capitalism. Both are built on an incoherent foundation of free will and moral responsibility.

Religion’s stance on this makes a certain amount of sense since it’s rooted in unexplainable belief systems. But laissez-faire capitalism, like Ayn Rand’s, denies religion yet clings to an equally impossible belief in ultimate moral responsibility to justify its survival-of-the-fittest mindset. The cognitive dissonance is fascinating.

Now let’s break it down.

Compatibilism is the idea that free will and determinism can coexist. In theory, it sounds great: you get to keep your sense of moral responsibility while still accepting that everything is caused by prior events. But here's the thing—it just doesn’t make sense when you dig deeper.

Determinism means that every action we take is the result of previous causes—our genetics, environment, past experiences, etc. In other words, we never really have control. Our choices are just the output of factors beyond our power. So when compatibilists argue that we're still "free" because we act according to our desires or intentions, they miss the point. The real issue isn't about whether you're acting on what you want; it's about why you want those things in the first place. And those wants are just as determined as your actions.

This is where compatibilism falls apart. It clings to the illusion of control. Sure, you may feel like you're making choices, but the idea that you could have done otherwise is incoherent in a deterministic framework. And if you couldn’t have done otherwise, then how can you be held morally responsible for anything? How is it fair to blame or praise someone for actions that were inevitable, given the causes behind them?

People act the way they do because of the natural behaviors that flow from their makeup and circumstances. Punishing or rewarding them as if they had real, ultimate control doesn't hold up under scrutiny. Instead, we should focus on understanding people’s natural tendencies and responding in ways that shape future outcomes—not out of moral judgment, but out of practicality.

So, what are we left with? A need to rethink how we view responsibility. Instead of clinging to outdated notions of free will that don’t hold up, we should shift our focus toward improving outcomes based on human behavior as it actually is. If we let go of the illusion of free will and compatibilism, we’d stop wasting energy on blame, punishment, and moral outrage. Instead, we could focus on practical ways to influence behavior and create systems that reduce harm and increase well-being. When we recognize that people's actions stem from factors beyond their control, it opens the door to more compassionate, effective approaches to justice and societal improvement. Gregg Caruso explains this shift brilliantly in his talk here: [Gregg Caruso on free will and moral responsibility](

In short, rejecting compatibilism and free will doesn’t make society fall apart; it builds a stronger foundation for understanding and shaping the behaviors we care about. If we’re ever to achieve the “cosmic realism” of an enlightened Carl Sagan or Albert Einstein, we need to come to terms with what Spinoza, Nietzsche and Schopenhauer already knew: basic desert moral responsibility is not only non-existent, the very idea is incoherent, a form of premature, knee-jerk philosophical Pragmatism and born of what boils down to unnecessary fear. (And even if determinism isn’t true, that would make events random, and where’s the freedom in that?)

What we do about this revelation is a topic for another day. I have some ideas. You?